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ST. GEORGE TUCKER'S SECOND AMENDMENT:
DECONSTRUCTING "THE TRUE PALLADIUM OF
LIBERTY"
Stephen P. Halbrook I
A bill of rights may be considered, not only
as intended to give law, and assign limits to
a government about to be established, but as
giving information to the people. By reduc-
ing speculative truths to fundamental laws,
every man of the meanest capacity and un-
derstanding, may learn his own rights, and
know when they are violated ....
- St. George Tucker
2
Introduction
The Bill of Rights, according to the above view, is
designed to inform ordinary citizens of their rights. Its
meaning is not a monopoly of the governmental entities
whose powers the Bill of Rights was intended to limit. By
1 Attorney at Law, Fairfax, Va.; Ph.D. Florida State University, J.D.
Georgetown University; former philosophy professor, Tuskegee Uni-
versity, Howard University, George Mason University. Books include
A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL BILLS OF RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES (1989); FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK
(2007); FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMS, 1866 -1876 (1998); THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE
EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984, 2000); THE FOUND-
ERS' SECOND AMENDMENT (forthcoming). Argued Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and other Supreme Court cases. See
further www.stephenhalbrook.com. © Copyright 2007 by Stephen P.
Halbrook. All rights reserved.
2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, View of the Constitution of the United States, in
1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. D at
308 (William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803).
1
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knowing when their rights are violated, the citizens may
signify their displeasure through mechanisms, such as the
ballot box and the jury box, and may resort to speech, the
press, assembly, and petition to denounce the evil. The
Second Amendment "right of the people to keep and bear
Arms" 3 was intended to serve as the ultimate check, which
the Founders hoped would dissuade people at the helm of
state from seeking to establish tyranny.
Although humble people generally think that they
are among "the people," a segment of the not-so-humble
appear to disagree when it comes to the right of "the
people" to keep and bear arms. 5 Did the Founders mean
what they seem to have said, or were their words too com-
plex for the common people to understand? The following
article seeks to provide some insights into that question
through an examination of the writings of St. George Tuck-
3 "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed." U.S. CONST. amend. H.
4 This view was expressed just ten days after Madison proposed the Bill
of Rights in Congress:
As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people,
duly before them, may attempt to tyrannize, and as
the military forces which shall be occasionally raised
to defend our country, might pervert their power to
the injury of their fellow-citizens, the people are con-
firmed by the next article in their right to keep and
bear their private arms.
"A Pennsylvanian," Tench Coxe, Remarks on the First Part of the
Amendments to the Federal Constitution, FED. GAZETTE, June 18,
1789, at 2; see Stephen P. Halbrook & David B. Kopel, Tench Coxe
and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 1787-1823, 7 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 347, 367 (1999).
5 "Half (50%) of the American population wrongly believe the Consti-
tution gives every citizen the right to own a handgun." HEARST RE-
PORT, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 27 (The Hearst Corp. 1987) (emphasis added).
2
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er and a recent reevaluation of those writings.
When Thomas Jefferson was elected as President of
the United States in 1801, students from the College of
William and Mary celebrated with a glass of wine at the
house of their acclaimed professor, Judge St. George Tuck-
er.6 Tucker was already at work writing what would be the
first and foremost treatise on the Constitution and Bill of
Rights. Published in 1803 and known as Tucker's Black-
stone, the work included the English jurist's Commentaries
along with Tucker's reflections on the American system.
7
During the American Revolution, Tucker had
smuggled in arms from the West Indies at the behest of
Governor Patrick Henry, 8 and as a militia colonel, Tucker
fought against British forces. 9 After the Revolution, Tuck-
er practiced law. Tucker, along with James Madison and
Edmund Randolph, was appointed to the Annapolis Con-
vention of 1786.10 The Annapolis Convention served as a
6 MARY HALDANE COLEMAN, ST. GEORGE TUCKER: CrIzEN OF No
MEAN CITY 127 (The Dietz Press 1938).
7 Tucker's Appendix, "the first disquisition upon the character and
interpretation of the Federal Constitution, as well as upon its origin and
true nature," was for years used as a textbook in Virginia and other
states in the early republic. J. Randolph Tucker, The Judges Tucker of
the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1 VA. L. REG. 789, 793-94 (1896); see
Stephen P. Halbrook, St. George Tucker: The American Blackstone, 32
VA. B. NEWS, Feb. 1984, at 45-46.
8 Halbrook, supra note 7, at 47. In 1775, Tucker heard Patrick Henry's
famous "Liberty or Death" speech, and left one of only three detailed
accounts of that debate. TYLER COrT MOSES, PATRICK HENRY 145
(reprinted New York 1980) (1887).
9 COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 35, 48-58. Tucker was appointed major of
the Chesterfield militia, which he led to join General Greene in North
Carolina. With sword and pistol, he dashed about on his horse Hob at
the Battle of Guilford Court House, rallying the wavering militiamen
and taking a bayonet wound in the leg. Halbrook, supra note 7, at 47.
Tucker eventually received a promotion to lieutenant colonel of a troop
of horsemen in the Virginia militia, and was actively involved in the
siege of Yorktown when Cornwallis surrendered. Id.10 Halbrook, supra note 7, at 47.
3
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warm-up for the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, which
framed the federal Constitution.11 However, Tucker was
known to have joined with George Mason and Patrick Hen-
ry in opposing its adoption without a bill of rights. 12 In
1788, as the States debated the proposed federal Constitu-
tion, Tucker was appointed judge of the General Court of
Virginia. 13 After serving on the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, 14 President James Madison appointed Tucker United
States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia in
1813.15
In 2006, the Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the
William and Mary College of Law held a symposium on
the influence of St. George Tucker on American law.
16
Professor Saul Cornell of Ohio State University presented a
paper on Tucker's views on the right to bear arms.17 As
Cornell notes, "St. George Tucker described the Second
Amendment as 'the true palladium of liberty.""'
8
As the first major commentator on the Constitution,
Tucker's views should be accorded close scrutiny, 19 partic-
ularly on an issue like the Second Amendment, which has
received little attention from the Supreme Court. 20 Profes-
1' Id.
12 Id.; see Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (Oct. 24,
1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 279-81 (Boyd ed.,
1955).
13 Halbrook, supra note 7, at 47.
14 See, e.g., Halbrook, supra note 7, at 49.
15 "Biographical Sketch of the Judges of the Court of Appeals," 8 Va.
(4 Call.) 627 (1827).16 Institute of Bill of Rights Law Symposium: St. George Tucker and His
Influence on American Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 111 (2006).
17 Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Origi-
nal Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1123, 1123 n.* (2006).
18 Id. at 1123; see TUCKER, supra note 2, at 300.
19 "[T]he Supreme Court has cited Tucker in over forty cases." David
B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998
BYUL. REV., 1359, 1376.
20 "Our most recent treatment of the Second Amendment occurred in
4
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sor Cornell has emerged as perhaps the leading exponent of
the view that the Second Amendment recognizes no indi-
vidual right to possess arms, and instead protects a civic
duty to bear arms in the militia. 21 Accordingly, an analysis
of Tucker's views on the issue reveals much of importance
on the Second Amendment, and an analysis of Cornell's
views on Tucker may reveal more about the position that
the Amendment eschews any individual right.
In his article, Cornell seeks to refute "supporters of
gun rights" who misinterpret Tucker as espousing that "the
right to bear arms was originally understood to protect an
individual right to keep and use firearms for personal self-
defense, hunting, and any other lawful activity."22 Refer-
ring to the controversy over "gun rights and gun control,"
Cornell avers, "The individual rights misreading of Tucker
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) .... The Court did not,
however, attempt to define, or otherwise construe, the substantive right
protected by the Second Amendment." Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 938 n.1 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring). Only in recent
years has the Second Amendment been accorded detailed scrutiny by
the federal courts of appeals. Compare United States v. Emerson, 270
F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (Second Amendment "protects the rights
of individuals, including those not then actually a member of any
militia... to privately possess and bear their own firearms ...."), cert.
denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002), with Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052,
1060 (9th Cir. 2002) (adopting "the 'collective rights' model, [which]
asserts that the Second Amendment right to 'bear arms' guarantees the
right of the people to maintain effective state militias, but does not
provide any type of individual right to own or possess weapons."),
petition for reh. denied, 328 F.3d 567, 568 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1046 (2003).
21 Cornell is the Director of the Second Amendment Research Center at
the John Glenn Institute, Ohio State University. Cornell, supra note
17, at 1123 n.*- According to the Freedom States Alliance, a firearm
prohibition lobby, Cornell's new book "blows away the NRA myths
about the Second Amendment." (E-mail solicitation from in-
fo@freedomstatesalliance.com, Sept. 19, 2006); see SAUL CORNELL, A
WELL REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS
OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (Oxford University Press 2006).
22 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1123.
5
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is merely the latest example of how constitutional scholar-
ship has been hijacked for ideological purposes in this
bitter debate."
23
I. "THE PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY":
TUCKER'S BLACKSTONE VERSUS CORNELL'S TUCKER
Debunking the individual-rights "hijackers" of the
Second Amendment, Professor Cornell refers to "the often-
quoted passage describing it [the Second Amendment] as
the 'palladium of liberty"' at least five times,' but he
strangely fails to provide the actual quotation or to ac-
knowledge its contents. Providing Tucker's actual quota-
tion or acknowledging its contents would be worthwhile in
order to determine the extent of the constitutional hijacking
by scholars who read the Second Amendment as protecting
individual rights.
After quoting the text of the Amendment, Tucker
began as follows:
This may be considered as the true palla-
dium of liberty .... The right of self defence
is the first law of nature: in most govern-
ments, it has been the study of rulers to con-
fine this right within the narrowest limits
possible. Wherever standing armies are kept
up, and the right of the people to keep and
bear arms is, under any colour or pretext
whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not al-
ready annihilated, is on the brink of destruc-
25tion.
23 Id. at 1124.
24Id. at 1123-25, 1137, 1143.
25 TUCKER, supra note 2, at 300. The above is similar to Tucker's style
in explaining, a few pages earlier, the freedom of the press protected by
the First Amendment as follows:
6
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Cornell's thesis is that Tucker, along with the
Founders in general, saw the Second Amendment as gua-
ranteeing a "state right" to maintain a militia, excluding an
individual right to have and carry arms for self defense,
which the legislature is free to curtail or prohibit. Tucker's
comment, however, clearly espouses the view that the
Second Amendment protects the individual right to bear
arms and to use them for self defense - "the first law of
nature.'26
The above quotation did not mention the militia
although Tucker certainly saw the militia as the republican
alternative to a standing army. After all, the right to arms
for defense extended to protection from both individual
criminals and public tyranny.
Moreover, as noted, Tucker saw any prohibition on
the right "under any colour or pretext whatsoever" as dan-
gerous to liberty. 27 He explained further,
In England, the people have been disarmed,
generally, under the specious pretext of pre-
serving the game: a never failing lure to
bring over the landed aristocracy to support
any measure, under that mask, though calcu-
[A] representative democracy ceases to exist the
moment that the public functionaries are by any
means absolved from their responsibility to their con-
stituents; and this happens whenever the constituent
can be restrained in any manner from speaking, writ-
ing, or publishing his opinions upon any public
measure, or upon the conduct of those who may ad-
vise or execute it.
Id. at 297. The above was quoted in the seminal case of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
Justice Black found in Tucker's work "the general view held when the
First Amendment was adopted and ever since." Id. at 296.
26 TUCKER, supra note 2, at 300.
27 Id.
7
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lated for very different purposes. True it is,
their bill of rights seems at first view to
counteract this policy: but the right of bear-
ing arms is confined to protestants, and the
words suitable to their condition and degree,
have been interpreted to authorise the prohi-
bition of keeping a gun or other engine for
the destruction of game, to any farmer, or in-
ferior tradesman, or other person not quali-
fied to kill game. So that not one man in
five hundred can keep a gun in his house
without being subject to a penalty.28
Thus, when explaining how the right to keep and
bear arms was violated in England, Tucker pointed in part
to English game laws that prohibited individuals from
keeping guns, even at home. 29 He said nothing about any
laws that disarmed militias. This silence is inconsistent
with Cornell's thesis that the right to bear arms protects
only militias from being disarmed.
Tucker also referred to the English Declaration of
Rights of 1689, which stated, "That the Subjects which are
Protestants, may have Arms for their Defence suitable to
their Conditions, and as allowed by Law." 30 This was a
right of Protestant "Subjects" - not militiamen - to "have
Arms for their Defence," and Tucker referred to this right
as the English variety of "the right of bearing arms" with-
28 Id.
29 Although English game laws were in some cases enforced in a man-
ner to prevent subjects from keeping guns, English judicial precedents
actually held that the people at large could keep arms at home, and that
guns could be seized only when actually being used contrary to the
hunting prohibitions. See Rex v. Gardner, 87 Eng. Rep. 1240 (KB.
1739); STEPHEN HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 51-53
(1984) (analyzing other cases).
30 An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, 1 W. & M.
2, c. 2 (1689) (Eng.).
8
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out imposing any militia context.
Blackstone had written that "a reason oftener meant,
than avowed, by the makers of forest or game laws" was
"for prevention of popular insurrections and resistance to
the government, by disarming the bulk of the people...
,,31 Historically, conquerors, who founded the European
kingdoms, endeavored "to keep the rustici or natives of the
country.., in as low a condition as possible, and especially
to prohibit them the use of arms. Nothing could do this
more effectually than a prohibition of hunting and sporting
... ,32 Feudal laws thus "prohibit[ed] the rustici in gener-
al from carrying arms" and severely proscribed hunting.
33
Commenting on Blackstone's text, Tucker again
juxtaposed the limited right to have arms under the English
Declaration with the game laws. "In the construction of
these game laws it seems to be held, that no person who is
not qualified according to law to kill game, hath any right
to keep a gun in his house."' 34 Because only persons with
an income of 100 pounds per annum were qualified to hunt,
"it follows that no others can keep a gun for their defence;
so that the whole nation are completely disarmed, and left
at the mercy of the government, under the pretext of pre-
serving the breed of hares and partridges, for the exclusive
use of the independent country gentlemen." 35 Tucker con-
cluded that "[i]n America we may reasonably hope that the
people will never cease to regard the right of keeping and
bearing arms as the surest pledge of their liberty."
36
Again, Tucker discussed the right to keep and bear
arms as protecting the liberty to keep a gun for defense in
the home and to carry arms, including for hunting. No
mention was made of state militia powers or bearing arms
31 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *412 (Tucker ed., 1803).32 Id. at *413.
33 id.
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in a militia. Cornell disregards the above passages alto-
gether.
Although declining to quote the words of Tucker's
"palladium of liberty" text, Cornell notes that Justice Jo-
seph Story used the same allegory in his Commentaries on
the Constitution. Cornell states, "While individual rights
scholars have often cited Story in modern Second Amend-
ment scholarship, they have studiously avoided examining
his own analysis of the original understanding of the
Second Amendment." 37 Cornell proceeds to quote a com-
ment by Justice Story regarding Congress' militia power
being "concurrent with that of the states."
' 38
As with Tucker, Cornell studiously avoids mention
of the content of Story's analysis of the Second Amend-
ment, much less does he quote any of Story's "palladium of
liberty" statement. Story's interpretation is unmistakable:
The right of the citizens to keep, and bear
arms has justly been considered, as the pal-
ladium of the liberties of the republic; since
it offers a strong moral check against usur-
pation and arbitrary power of rulers; and
will generally, even if these are successful in
the first instance, enable the people to resist,
and triumph over them. 
39
Story cited Tucker for that proposition as well as for
the following proposition about the right of subjects "to
37 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1131.
38 Id.
39 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1001, at
708 (1833), citing, inter alia, Tucker, supra note 2, at 300. "Perhaps, at
some future date, this Court will have the opportunity to determine
whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the right to bear
arms 'has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a
republic."' Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (citation omitted).
10
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have arms for their defense" under the English Declaration
of Rights: "But under various pretenses the effect of this
provision has been greatly narrowed; and it is at present in
England more nominal than real, as a defensive privi-
lege." 40 Story was referring to possession of arms by indi-
viduals, not by militias. Although Story also stressed the
importance of a well-regulated militia, this view was hardly
inconsistent with the individual right to have arms.
41
Having left the reader in the dark about what Tuck-
er and Story actually said on "the palladium of liberty,"
Cornell asserts that for both, "Protection of states' rights,
not individual rights, was the issue that had prompted the
inclusion of the Second Amendment." 42 Aside from the
constitutional vocabulary that governments (federal and
state) have only "powers" and not "rights," and that only
individuals have "rights,"43 the Second Amendment was
prompted by the perceived need to protect the right of indi-
viduals to keep and bear arms, which would encourage a
well-regulated militia.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To ARMS FOR SELF
DEFENSE?
Blackstone's Commentaries analyzed the right to
have arms in the first chapter, entitled "Of the Absolute
Rights of Individuals," of the first book, entitled "Of the
40 STORY, supra note 39, § 1891 at 747.
41 Elsewhere, Story fused the individual right with the need for a militia
quite neatly as follows: "One of the ordinary modes, by which tyrants
accomplish their purposes without resistance, is, by disarming the
people, and making it an offence to keep arms, and by substituting a
regular army in the stead of a resort to the militia." STORY, A FAMILI-
AR ExPosrrION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 450, at
319 (Regnery Gateway, Inc. 1986) (Harper 1859).
12 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1132.
43 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 and U.S. CONST. amend. X (federal
and state "powers") with U.S. CONST. amends. I, II, IV, and IX
("rights" of the people).
11
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Rights of Persons." Therein he referred to "auxiliary sub-
ordinate rights of the subject, which serve principally as
outworks or barriers, to protect and maintain inviolate the
three great and primary rights, of personal security, person-
al liberty, and private property." 44  Besides the right to
petition, Blackstone included among these auxiliary rights
the following:
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the sub-
ject, that I shall at present mention, is that of
having arms for their defence suitable to
their condition and degree, and such as are
allowed by law. Which is also declared by
the same statute 1 W. & M. st. 2 c. 2 [the
Declaration of Rights], and it is indeed, a
public allowance under due restrictions, of
the natural right of resistance and self-
preservation, when the sanctions of society
and laws are found insufficient to restrain
the violence of oppression.
45
To the above, Tucker counterpoised the following:
"The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed. Amendments to C. U. S. Art. 4, and this without
any qualification as to their condition or degree, as is the
case in the British government." 46 Although Cornell refers
to this statement of Tucker, he fails to quote it and asserts
that it does "not address the question of individual self-
defense." 47 Yet the discussion concerns a "right of the
44 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES, *93, *141 (Tucker ed.,
1803).
45 Id. at *144.
46 Id. at * 144 n.40. Tucker referred to the Second Amendment as
Article Four of the Amendments because that was the original number-
ing Congress used when submitting the amendments to the States for
ratification.
47 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1146.
12
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subjects" to use arms for "self-preservation" when the law
is inadequate, and no mention is made of the militia. In-
deed, to Blackstone's above words, Tucker added the fol-
lowing further note:
Whoever examines the forest, and game
laws in the British code, will readily perce-
ive that the right of keeping arms is effec-
tually taken away from the people of
England. The commentator himself informs
us, Vol. II, p. 412, "that the prevention of
popular 'insurrections and resistence to gov-
ernment by disarming the bulk' of the
people, is a reason oftener meant than
avowed by the makers of the forest and
game laws.",
48
Again, the forest and game laws repressed the right
of individuals to keep arms, in order to enable the ruling
monarchy to control the commoners. Such laws had no
applicability to "State's rights" to maintain a militia - in-
deed, England had no States - or to bearing arms in a mili-
tia. Tucker clearly saw the Second Amendment as
prohibiting infringements on the individual right to have
arms.
Contending that the right to have arms in the Eng-
lish Declaration had no self-defense component, Cornell
argues that this auxiliary right, "the right to have arms,"
was aimed at preventing the violence of oppression, not
defending oneself against thieves., 49 But Blackstone made
no distinction between defense against robbers or tyrants,
nor did he limit defense to organized groups and exclude
individual defense. Indeed, the right of having arms vindi-
cated the rights to "personal security" and "personal liber-
48 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *144 n.41.
49 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1146.
13
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ty." As Blackstone further explained,
In these several articles consist the rights, or,
as they are frequently termed, the liberties of
Englishmen . . . . And, lastly, to vindicate
these rights, when actually violated or at-
tacked, the subjects of England are entitled,
in the first place, to the regular administra-
tion and free course of justice in the courts
of law; next, to the right of petitioning the
king and parliament for redress of griev-
ances; and, lastly, to the right of having and
using arms for self-preservation and de-
fence.
50
The use of arms "for self-preservation and defense"
could be applied to an individual or a collective group. An
aggressor could be a single murderer or a renegade military
force that stages a coup d' 6tat and overthrows the constitu-
tion. Contrary to Cornell, Blackstone did not limit self-
preservation to some kind of elusive collective right and
eschew individual defense.
Tucker made further references to infringement of
the individual right to bear arms, which Cornell fails to
mention. Tucker explained how the British Parliament
would violate basic rights in the guise of some necessary
objective, but that Congress had no such power. He reite-
rated that in England the game laws "have been converted
into the means of disarming the body of the people," and
that "the acts directing the mode of petitioning parliament,
[sic] and those for prohibiting riots: and for suppressing
assemblies of free-masons, [sic] are so many ways for pre-
venting public meetings of the people to deliberate upon
their public, or national concerns." 51 By contrast, Congress
5 0 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *143-44.
51 TUCKER, supra note 2, at 315.
14
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had "no power to regulate, or interfere with the domestic
concerns, or police of any state.., nor will the constitution
permit any prohibition of arms to the people; or of peacea-
ble assemblies by them, for the purposes whatsoever, and
in any number, whenever they may see occasion."
52
In short, the Bill of Rights precluded "any" ban on
arms "to the people" or of their peaceable assemblies.
Tucker wrote "the people," not "the militia," and he ob-
viously had in mind the rights protected by the First and
Second Amendments.
This pattern is pervasive. Cornell argues that Tuck-
er, in his discussion of the law of treason, sharply con-
trasted "the common law right to keep or carry firearms and
the constitutional right to bear arms" in a militia.53 Regard-
ing the law of treason in England, Sir Matthew Hale ob-
served in Pleas of the Crown that "the very use of weapons
by such an assembly, without the king's licence, unless in
some lawful and special cases, carries a terror with it, and a
presumption of warlike force, &c." 54 Tucker commented
that "[t]he bare circumstance of having arms, therefore, of'
itself, creates a presumption of warlike force in England,
and may be given in evidence there, to prove quo animo the
people are assembled., 55 Cornell acknowledges that state-
ment but then avoids any reference to what Tucker pro-
ceeded to ask:
But ought that circumstance of itself, to
create any such presumption in America,
where the right to bear arms is recognized
and secured in the constitution itself? In
52 1d. at 315-16.
53 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1147.
54 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, Concerning Treason, in 5 BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES;
AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, app. B at 19 (1803).
55 Id.
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many parts of the United States, a man no
more thinks, of going out of his house on
any occasion, without his rifle or musket in
his hand, than an European fine gentleman
without his sword by his side.
56
As usual, Cornell avoids the embarrassing quota-
tions. As an example of exercising "the right to bear arms"
as "secured in the constitution," Tucker referred to a man
"going out of his house on any occasion" - not just for a
militia muster - with "his rifle or musket in his hand."
Cornell's veiled reference to the above two sentences revis-
es them to say that, in Tucker's view, "the mere fact of
traveling armed with a musket did not by itself create any
presumption of illegality."
57
Cornell intersperses with the above a discussion of
the prosecutions arising out of the Whisky and Fries rebel-
lions. Cornell states, "The defense and prosecution in the
resulting cases conceded that traveling armed with militia
weapons did not enjoy constitutional protection when those
weapons were used outside of the context of militia-related
activity." 58 He cites a trio of reported cases for that propo-
sition, but these cases do not support this proposition. In
State v. Mitchell,59 the Attorney General argued the unre-
markable proposition that "to assemble in a body, armed
and arrayed, for some treasonable purpose, is an act of
levying war[.],, 60 No one, however, mentioned the consti-
tutional status of traveling with militia arms, whether when
on or off duty.
56 id.
57 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1148-49 n.152.
58 Id. at 1148 (citing United States v. Fries, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 515 (Pa. D.
1799); United States v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348, 26 F. Cas. 1277
(Pa. D. 1795) (No. 15,788); United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346
(Pa. D. 1795)).
'9 2 U.S. at 348.60Id. at 354.
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III. JUDICIAL REVIEW: INVALIDATING INFRINGEMENTS
ON LIBERTY OR DICTATING TO THE MILITARY
COMMAND?
Cornell's rendition of Tucker is long on Cornell's
characterizations and citations to recent law review articles
supporting the "collective rights" view of the Second
Amendment but woefully short on Tucker's actual words.
This pattern also arises when Cornell discusses Tucker's
views on judicial review. Cornell claims that Tucker con-
jured up a scenario of "federal disarmament of the militia"
in a discussion about whether courts could declare laws
unconstitutional.61
Tucker made no such mention about the militia. In
the reference cited by Cornell, Tucker contended that judi-
cial review is particularly applicable to laws purportedly
passed not under an enumerated power, but under the "ne-
cessary and proper" clause, which violated the Bill of
Rights guarantees. A court may declare a federal criminal
law unconstitutional in the following circumstance:
If, for example, congress were to pass a law
prohibiting any person from bearing arms,
as a means of preventing insurrections, the
judicial courts, under the construction of the
words necessary and proper, here contended
for, would be able to pronounce decidedly
upon the constitutionality of these means.
But if congress may use any means, which
they choose to adopt, the provision in the
constitution which secures to the people the
right of bearing arms, is a mere nullity; and
any man imprisoned for bearing arms under
such an act, might be without relief; because
61 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1138 (citing TUCKER, supra note 2, at
289).
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in that case, no court could have any power
to pronounce on the necessity or propriety of
the means adopted by congress to carry any
specified power into complete effect. 
62
In the above quotation, Tucker referred to a law
prohibiting "any person" - not a militia - from bearing
arms. Judicial review would be initiated by "any man"
imprisoned for bearing arms, rather than a State claiming
federal usurpation of its militia power or an individual
claiming rejection by a militia force. In short, the Second
Amendment protected individuals from federal laws which
would prohibit possession of arms and impose imprison-
ment for having arms.
Tucker expanded on this analysis of judicial protec-
tion for the right to keep and bear arms in a further passage.
Cornell refers to a passage's page number but neither
quotes the passage nor summarizes its content. 63  Tucker
wrote,
If, for example, a law be passed by congress,
prohibiting the free exercise of religion, ac-
cording to the dictates, or persuasions of a
man's own conscience; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people to assemble peaceably, or
62 TUCKER, supra note 2, at 289. Tucker adhered to the then-incipient
view that the courts are duty bound to declare statutes contrary to the
constitution as void. In a General Court case decided in 1793, Judge
Tucker opined that the Virginia Constitution of 1776, being the sove-
reign act of the people and hence the supreme law, "is a rule to all
departments of the government, to the judiciary as well as to the legis-
lature .... " Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. Cas. 20, 23 (Va. Gen. Ct.
1793). Chief Justice John Marshall would espouse that view in Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
63 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1138 (citing TUCKER, supra note 2, at
357).
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to keep and bear arms; it would, in any of
these cases be the province of the judiciary
to pronounce whether any such act were
constitutional, or not; and if not, to acquit
the accused from any penalty which might
be annexed to the breach of such unconstitu-
tional act. . . . The judiciary, therefore, is
that department of the government to whom
the protection of the rights of the individual
is by the constitution especially confided, in-
terposing it's shield between him and the
sword of usurped authority, the darts of op-
pression, and the shafts of faction and vi-
olence.
64
The right to have arms, under the above view, was
on par with freedom of religion, speech, and assembly, and
abridgment of any of these rights should be declared un-
constitutional. The judiciary had a special responsibility to
protect these "rights of the individual."
Cornell, who refuses to quote the relevant passages,.
refers to "The modem individual rights misreading of
Tucker," and asserts, "[t]he danger that Tucker appre-
hended was federal disarmament of the state militias."
65
He adds, "If Federalists tried to restrict the right to bear
arms in the militia, Tucker believed that federal courts
should strike down such laws as unconstitutional."' 66 Tuck-
er, however, never mentioned the militia in the above pas-
sages, not even once.
As for the alleged "right to bear arms in the militia,"
those conscripted into the militia apparently have a "right"
to do that which they are ordered to do on pain of fines or
imprisonment. It is a rather curious "right" to do some-
64 Tucker, supra note 2, at 357.
65 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1139.
66 Id. at 1139-40.
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thing one is forced to do. As for those who are not con-
scripted into the militia, they have an even more radical
"right" to be so conscripted.
Specifically, based on the same passage from Tuck-
er quoted above, Cornell asserts that to Tucker "the right to
bear arms in a well-regulated militia was a judicially enfor-
ceable privilege and immunity of federal citizenship."
' 67
Aside from the fact that Tucker did not say or even imply
that, the implications of this statement are astonishing. It
suggests that a person who is not a member of a militia
could file a federal lawsuit and obtain a judicial decree
ordering those in authority to accept such person as a mili-
tia member and further ordering that such person be able to
bear arms. Could such person also choose which arm he or
she would like to bear, as well as decide where and when to
do so? Such a doctrine is inconsistent with the fundamental
concept of compelled enrollment into a military force and
its system of command.
Tucker himself noted that the 1792 Militia Act
"establishing an uniform militia throughout the United
States, seems to have excluded all but free white men from
bearing arms in the militia." 68 Indeed, the Act provided in
67 Id. at 1126 (citing Tucker, supra note 2, at 356-57). Cornell claims
that this view was adopted by Republicans in the Department of Justice
during Reconstruction, but only cites two works supportive of the view
that Reconstruction Republicans held the Second Amendment to be a
right of individuals, including freed slaves, which was incorporated
against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. AKHIL REED AMAR,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 257-66 (1998);
STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876 viii (1998). The Depart-
ment pursued criminal indictments in federal courts alleging that the
individual rights of freedmen to assemble and to have arms under the
First and Second Amendments were violated by private conspirators.
See HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, chapters 6-7.
68 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, On the State of Slavery in Virginia, in 2
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, app. H at 37 n. Elsewhere, Tucker
summarized the militia law in part as follows:
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part that "each and every free able-bodied white male citi-
zen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall
be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-
five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall several-
ly and respectively be enrolled in the militia by the captain
or commanding officer of the company, within whose
bounds such citizen shall reside . .,,69 Even within that
limited class, various occupations, from government offi-
cials to persons involved in crucial transportation services,
were exempt from the militia.7 °
According to the Cornell thesis, the people not
qualified by law to be in the militia because of age, sex,
race, occupation, not being able-bodied, or simply not be-
ing needed had a judicially enforceable right under the
Second Amendment to enlist in the militia so that they
could "bear arms." The above statutory limitations pre-
sumably should have been declared unconstitutional by the
courts.
Moreover, the Act also required every person
enrolled in the militia to "provide himself with a good
musket or firelock," as well as other equipment, and re-
quired him to "appear, so armed, accoutered and provided,.
when called out to exercise, or into service .... ,"71 Under
Every able bodied white male citizen of the respec-
tive states, of the age of eighteen, and under forty-
five years of age (except certain persons particularly
excepted, and all persons who now are, or may be
excepted by the laws of the respective states) shall be
enrolled in the militia: and every person so enrolled
shall, within six months, provide himself with arms,
&c. as directed by the act, and shall appear so armed,
&c. when called out to exercise, or into service. Id.
at 409 n.
69 Act of May 8, 1792, ch.33, §1, 1 Stat. 271, 271 (1792).
70 id. § 2.
71 id. § 1.
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the Cornellian constitutional right to bear arms in the mili-
tia, however, one not called out to exercise or into service
would have a judicially enforceable right to be called out to
the militia. Such person would also presumably have the
right to decide what kind of arms to bear, even if contrary
to what the law and the militia command prescribed.
In short, Cornell is so intent on deconstructing the
ordinary reading of the Second Amendment - that the
people have a right to keep and bear arms - that he conjures
up the unprecedented fantasy that a federal court could
dictate to military authorities, including the personnel of a
militia force together with their functions and arms. Reali-
ty was and remains otherwise. A militiaman's refusal to
peel potatoes when so commanded because he felt entitled
to "bear arms" would be insubordination - not the exercise
of a constitutional right - and could lead to a court-martial.
Tucker's views, as expressed in his edition of
Blackstone, were originally formulated in his law lectures
presented at the William and Mary College of Law. These
lectures, according to Cornell, do "not support the individ-
ual rights view," and Tucker "explicitly described the
Second Amendment as a right of the states ... ."" For
once, Cornell presents an actual quotation from Tucker,
instead of the usual snippet or failure to quote anything. In
this quotation, Tucker states that a State may choose "to
incur the expence of putting arms into the Hands of its own
Citizens for their defense," and that would not "contra-
vene" federal authority.73 "[T]o contend that such a power
would be dangerous" - on the basis that federal law might
be resisted or withdrawal from the Union might occur -
"would be subversive of every principle of Freedom in our
Government." 74 Tucker added that this quotation was the
view of the first federal Congress because it proposed what
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became the Second Amendment, which Tucker quotes.
"To this we may add that this power of arming the militia,
is not one of those prohibited to the States by the Constitu-
tion, and, consequently, is reserved to them under the
[Tenth Amendment].
This statement is consistent with both the power of
the state to arm its citizens, which is implied in both the
Militia Clause of the Second Amendment and in the re-
served powers guarantee of the Tenth Amendment, and the
right of the citizens to keep and bear such arms, which is
explicit in the Second Amendment's operative clause. In
short, the states had a reserved power to arm the militia,
and this reservation did not violate any power delegated to
the federal government. Contrary to Cornell, Tucker did
not assert that the Second Amendment secures nothing
more than a state militia power.
Tucker's above views from his law lectures reap-
peared in his View of the Constitution, which was published
as an appendix to his edition of Blackstone. The subject
was the Militia Power in Article I, Section 8 of the Consti-
tution, which delegates power to Congress "[t]o provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the
Service of the United States, reserving to the States respec-
tively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority
of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed
by Congress. ,76
The objective of this provision, according to Tuck-
er, could be traced to the Virginia Bill of Rights, which
declared "that a well-regulated militia, composed of the
body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural,
75 Id. at 1130. Indeed, the Constitution was clear when it prohibited
military powers to the States. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No
State shall.., keep Troops... in time of Peace").
76 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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and safe defence of a free state ... ... Tucker recalled the
proposed amendment by the Virginia Convention that rati-
fied the Constitution in 1788: "that each state respectively
should have the power to provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining its own militia, whensoever Congress
should omit or neglect to provide for the same."'78 (As
discussed below, that provision was rejected by Congress
when it considered amendments in 1789.) Any "uneasiness
upon the subject, seems to be completely removed," Tucker
continued, by the Second Amendment. 79 "To which we
may add, that the power of arming the militia, not being
prohibited to the states, respectively, by the constitution, is,
consequently, reserved to them, concurrently with the fed-
eral government."
80
The above was consistent with Tucker's other
comments in the View on the Second Amendment. Recog-
nition of the right of the people to have arms promoted a
well-regulated militia. Contrary to Cornell, the two con-
cepts are hardly irreconcilable.
As noted above, the Virginia Convention proposed
a state power to provide for the militia should Congress
neglect to do so. This was among the structural amend-
ments concerning federal and state powers that the conven-
tion proposed. Virginia also proposed an entirely separate
list of "unalienable rights," including "[t]hat the people
have a right to freedom of speech," and "[t]hat the people
77 Tucker, supra note 2, at 273 (quoting Virginia Declaration of Rights,
Art. XIff (1776)).
78 Id.; see 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 660 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 1836) [hereinafter 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CON-
VENTIONS].79 Tucker, supra note 2, at 273.
80 d. The focus of Tucker's discussion was the Militia Power, not the
Second Amendment, which was mentioned only once. Id. at 273.
Cornell cites these same pages and claims: "This discussion of the
Second Amendment clearly frames the issue in terms of the militia."
Cornell, supra note 17, at 1138.
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have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated
militia, composed of the body of the people trained to arms,
is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state...
,,81
When the first federal Congress considered amend-
ments to the Constitution, the proposed bill of rights was
considered separately from the structural amendments. The
Senate passed provisions, which would become the First
and Second Amendments, rejecting inclusion of an anti-
standing army provision in the latter.82 St. George Tucker
was informed of these Senate proceedings.
83
The Senate considered separately, and rejected, all
structural amendments to the Constitution, including the
Virginia proposal: "That each state, respectively, shall
have the power to provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining its own militia, whensoever Congress shall
omit or neglect to provide for the same .... 84 The lin-
guistic differences are unmistakable: this posited the
"power" of the "state" to organize, arm, and discipline its
militia, in contrast with the "right" of "the people" to keep
and bear arms.
John Randolph wrote to St. George Tucker about
the Senate action as follows: "A majority of the Senate
were for not allowing the militia arms & if two thirds had-
agreed it would have been an amendment to the Constitu-
tion. They are afraid that the Citizens will stop their full
81 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note
78, at 659.82 JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 70-71 (Gales & Seaton 1820) [hereinafter JOUR-
NAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE].
83 Letter from Theodorick Bland Randolph to St. George Tucker (Sept.
9, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY
RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, at 293 (Helen E. Veit et
al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS].
14 JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE, supra note 82, at
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career to Tyranny & Oppression."
85
Cornell, without any reference to the Senate's con-
sideration of the amendment regarding the State militia
power, mistakes Randolph's letter as concerning the
Second Amendment, and asserts: "As Randolph's letter to
Tucker suggests, the issue before the Senate was control of
the militia, not an individual right to use guns for personal
defense or hunting."86 Yet the Senate passed the individual
right to have arms and rejected the state power to maintain
militias. It cannot be the case that, by declaring the right of
the people to keep and bear arms, Congress actually in-
tended to declare the power of States to maintain militias -
the very proposal Congress rejected.
The Senate then returned to the bill of rights, pass-
ing a form of the First Amendment similar to the final ver-
sion, and rejecting a proposal to add "for the common
defence" after "bear arms" in the Second Amendment.
87
Had it succeeded, recognition of "the right of the people to
keep and bear arms for the common defense" would have
still guaranteed an individual right to keep arms, but could
have been interpreted as allowing arms to be borne only for
the common defense.
Cornell denies that the Senate's rejection of the
words "bear arms for the common defense" "establishes
that they intended to protect an individual right," claiming
that "Randolph's letter casts the choice to excise this lan-
guage in a radically different light.",88 To the contrary,
Senate action on the Second Amendment was entirely sepa-
rate from its action on the State militia power, which was
the subject of Randolph's letter. 89
85 Letter from John Randolph to St. George Tucker (Sept. 11, 1789), in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 83, at 293.
86 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1129. Strangely, Cornell describes the
Senate action as a defeat, rather than a victory, for the Federalists. Id.
87 JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE, supra note 82, at 77.
88 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1129 (citations omitted).
89 Cornell makes a single oblique reference to the failed State-militia-
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IV. TiE LINGUISTICS OF "BEARING ARMS":
"BEAR" DOES NOT MEAN CARRY, AND "ARMS" DOES
NOT MEAN HANDGUNS
Under Tucker's above linguistic usage, the term
"bear arms" simply means to carry a weapon, whether for
defense, hunting, militia purposes, or other reasons. How-
ever, Cornell argues that "bear arms" had an almost exclu-
sively military usage. 90 The evidence for this argument is
underwhelming.
The first state bill of rights to use the term "bear
arms" was that of Pennsylvania in 1776, which stated,
"That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence
of themselves and the state . ,91 Cornell denies that
such language denotes an individual right, since it did not
refer to the singular "right to bear arms in defense of him-
self and the State," as did one or more state bills of rights in
the nineteenth century. 92  Yet "defense of themselves"
power amendment, yet endeavors to attribute its meaning to the Second
Amendment: "Anti-Federalists failed to obtain their primary goal of
securing structural amendments to the Constitution that would have
shifted power back to the [S]tates.... Although an amendment restrict-
ing federal control over the militia was rejected, the adoption of the
Second Amendment was understood, at least by some, to provide some
protection for the state militias." Id. at 1133 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1140-44.
91 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights art. XIII (1776). Ignoring this
guarantee, Cornell asserts, "A few efforts had been made to incorporate
this common law principle [to bear a gun in self-defense] into state bills
of rights during the Founding Era, but those efforts inevitably failed."
Cornell, supra note 17, at 1144. His only example is that the Virginia
Declaration of Rights did not include Jefferson's proposal that "[N]o
freeman shall ever be debarred the use of arms ... ." Id. (citing THO-
MAS JEFFERSON, The Virginia Constitution, First Draft (1776), in 2 THE
PAPERS OF THoMAS JEFFERSON 329, 344 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton
University Press 1950)). Actually, none of Jefferson's draft bill of
rights was included.
92 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1141. The first constitution to use the
phrase "defense of himself and the State" was the Mississippi Constitu-
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meant self defense, otherwise, it would redundantly mean
"defense of the state."
Moreover, Pennsylvania kept that same clause in a
1790 revision as follows: "That the right of the citizens to
bear arms in defence of themselves and the State shall not
be questioned." 93 James Wilson, president of the conven-
tion that adopted the provision, a leading Federalist, and
later Supreme Court Justice, explained the guarantee in a
discussion of homicide "when it is necessary for the de-
fence of one's person or house." 94 He continued,
[I]t is the great natural law of self-
preservation, which, as we have seen, cannot
be repealed, or superseded, or suspended by
any human institution. This law, however,
is expressly recognised in the constitution of
Pennsylvania. "The right of the citizens to
bear arms in the defence of themselves shall
not be questioned." This is one of our many
renewals of the Saxon regulations. "They
were bound," says Mr. Selden, "to keep
arms for the preservation of the kingdom,
and of their own persons."
95
Cornell argues that only "isolated examples" exist
of the phrase "bear arms" used in an individual, non-
military sense, "an idiosyncratic text such as the Dissent of
tion. See MIss. CONST. art. L § 23 (1817).93 PA. CONST. art. IX, § XXI (1790).
94 3 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON
84 (Lorenzo Press 1804).
95 Id. (citations omitted); see Nathaniel Bacon, An Historical and Polit-
ical Discourse of the Laws and Government of England, in 1 COL-
LECTED FROM SOME MANUSCRIPT NomS OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. 40 (D.
Browne & A. Millar 1760) ("Freemen... were bound to keep Arms for
the preservation of the Kingdom, their Lords, and their own persons").
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the Pennsylvania Minority" being one example.9 6  The
Dissent of the Pennsylvania Minority was a proposal by
Anti-Federalists in the Pennsylvania convention that rati-
fied the Constitution in 1787 for a bill of rights, including
the following:
That the people have a right to bear arms for
the defense of themselves and their own
state, or the United States, or for the purpose
of killing game; and no law shall be passed
for disarming the people or any of them, un-
less for crimes committed, or real danger of
public injury from individuals .... 97
When the Bill of Rights was being debated in the
House of Representatives in 1789, Representative Frede-
rick A. Muhlenberg, who was then the Speaker of the
House and had also been president of the Pennsylvania
Ratification Convention, wrote, "[I]t takes in the principal
Amendments which our Minority had so much at Heart...
,98 The Second Amendment was merely a more concise
version of the above, sans its laundry list of purposes and
exceptions.
Cornell cites no proposed or adopted constitutional
guarantee that limited the terms "bear arms" as a "right" for
purely military use. He refers to a game bill that Jefferson
drafted and that Madison proposed to the Virginia legisla-
ture in 1785. 99 The bill provided for deer hunting seasons
outside one's enclosed land, punishing a violator with a
fine, and being bound to his good behavior. If within a
96 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1140 n.103.
97 2 TiE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CON-
STITUTION 623-24 (Merrill Jensen ed., State Historical Society of Wis-
consin 1976).
98 Letter from Frederick A. Muhlenberg to Benjamin Rush (Aug. 18,
1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 83, at 280.
99 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1141.
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year "he shall bear a gun out of his inclosed ground, unless
whilst performing military duty," the defendant would be in
violation of his recognizance. 100 Because this bill refers to
"bear[ing]" an arm when deer hunting or otherwise not on
military duty, Cornell's claim that "this text undermines the
claims of individual rights theorists" is difficult to under-
stand. 101
While ignoring Tucker's repeated use of "bear
arms" above to refer to individual use, Cornell points to
Tucker's work on slavery to show that the term "bear arms"
was "a legal term of art that clearly implied the use of arms
in a public capacity, not a private one."1 02 Writing in 1796,
Tucker noted that free Negroes "were formerly incapable of
serving in the militia, except as drummers or pioneers, but
now I presume they are enrolled in the lists of those that
bear arms, though formerly punishable for presuming to
appear at a muster-field." 10 3 Tucker republished his essay
on slavery in the Commentaries with new notations, includ-
ing the following in regard to the comment that free blacks
were enrolled in the militia: "This was the case under the
laws of the state; but the act of 2 Cong. c. 33, for establish-
ing an uniform militia throughout the United States, seems
to have excluded all but free white men from bearing arms
in the militia."
' 10 4
Despite the military assistance of free blacks and
even slaves in the Revolution, they were deprived of civil
rights, such as, "All but housekeepers, and persons residing
upon the frontiers are prohibited from keeping, or carrying
any gun, powder, shot, club, or other weapon offensive or
100 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Billfor Preservation of Deer, in 2 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 443-44 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
101 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1141.
102Id. at 1142.
103 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY: WITH A PRO-
POSAL FOR THE GRADUAL ABOLITION OF IT, IN THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
20 (Philadelphia 1796).104 TUCKER, supra note 68, at 37 n.
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defensive."
' 10 5
Tucker referred above to free blacks, who were
enrolled on the militia lists to "bear arms," as well as the
later exclusion of all but whites "from bearing arms in the
militia." In neither instance did he limit the term "bear
arms" to militia service, and in the latter, he specified that
the bearing of arms was "in the militia." Tucker used the
terms in the broadest manner in his plan for the emancipa-
tion of slaves, in which he proposed civil restrictions such
as, "Let no Negroe or mulattoe be capable ... of keeping,
or bearing arms, unless authorised so to do by some act of
the general assembly . .,106 He explained that "by dis-
arming them, we may calm our apprehensions of their re-
sentments arising from past sufferings ... .,, 107
Referring to the above prohibition on blacks "keep-
ing, or bearing arms," Cornell claims: "According to Tuck-
er's analysis, blacks would be prohibited from keeping
arms in their home, or from appearing at muster and being
105 TUCKER, supra note 103, at 20. Tucker also referred to the Virginia
act of 1680, renewed in 1705 and 1792, which "prohibited slaves from
carrying any club, staff, gun, sword, or other weapon, offensive or
defensive. This act was afterwards extended to all Negroes, mulattoes
and Indians whatsoever, with a few exceptions in favor of housekee-
pers, residents on a frontier plantation, and such as were enlisted in the
militia." Id. at 55. He noted about such laws the following: "From this
melancholy review it will appear that.., even the right of personal
security, has been, at times, either wholly annihilated, or reduced to a
shadow." Id. at 57.
106 TUCKER, supra note 103, at 93. Tucker added in a footnote to the
above: "See Spirit of Laws, 12, 15, 1. Blackst. Com. 417." Id. In that
passage, Blackstone relied on Montesquieu for the proposition that
slaves, excluded from liberty, envy and hate the rest of the community,
and thus warned "not to intrust those slaves with arms; who will then
find themselves an overmatch for the freemen." BLACKSTONE, supra
note 31, at *417-18. Montesquieu warned of "the danger of arming
slaves is not so great in monarchies as in republics." 1 BARON DE
MONTESQUiEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 243 (Thomas Nugent transl.,
1899).
107 TUCKER, supra note 103, at 95.
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issued arms they might bear as part of the militia."' 08 Yet
Tucker said nothing about any militia muster or being is-
sued arms - the prohibition was on "bearing arms" in any
form, which meant carrying arms in any manner, just as
under the slave codes.
In explaining the term "bear arms," Cornell not only
constricts the word "bear" to one narrow meaning, but also
does the same with the word "arms." Militia weapons such
as muskets were constitutionally protected (albeit limited to
militia use), while "civilian firearms," "ordinary guns," and
"personal arms such as pistols" were not. 109
However, pistols were indeed militia arms. Officers
in troops with horses were required by the 1792 Militia Act
to "be armed with a sword and pair of pistols."' 110 Tucker
himself fought in battles in the Revolution as a militia of-
ficer armed with sword and pistol.1 1' Not surprisingly,
Cornell finds nothing to cite from Tucker to substantiate his
claim.
Instead, Cornell quotes from an anonymous letter to
the editor writing on the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780 to the effect that "the legislature have [sic] a power to
controul [arms] in all cases, except the one mentioned in
the bill of rights . .,,112 Cornell adds, implying that he is
summarizing the author, "Personal arms such as pistols
were not treated in the same way as militia weapons such
as muskets." 113 Yet the author said absolutely nothing
about that subject. "In the absence of any law prohibiting
the ownership or use of personal firearms" - Cornell's
words, not the author's - "'the people still enjoy, and must
continue so to do till the legislature shall think fit to inter-
108 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1142.
' 9Id. at 1151.
110 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 stat. 272 § 4.
111 Halbrook, supra note 7, at 47.
112 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1151 (quoting Scribble Scrabble, CUM-
BERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Maine), Dec. 8, 1786).
113 id.
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Moreover, the context of the above was the Massa-
chusetts Constitution, which provided, "The people have a
right to keep and bear arms for the common defence."
115
The above author commented elsewhere, "All men ... have
... a right to keep and bear arms for their common defense,
to kill game, fowl .... The [Massachusetts] Bill of Rights
secures to the people the use of arms in common defence;
so that, if it be an alienable right, one use of arms is secured
to the people against any law of the legislature."' 116 The
federal Second Amendment includes no limitation on the
use of arms to the common defense, a clause which - as
discussed above - was explicitly rejected.
Running far a field of Tucker, Cornell also refer-
ences an 1837 Georgia law that prohibited the sale and
possession of pistols. 117 He neglects to mention that the
Georgia Supreme Court declared that law unconstitutional
under the Second Amendment, explaining that
The right of the whole people, old and
114 Id. (quoting Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland,
Maine), Jan. 26, 1786). Another author writing in the same newspaper
noted, "The idea that Great Britain meant to take away their arms, was
fresh in the minds of the people; therefore in forming a new govern-
ment, they wisely guarded against it." Senex, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE
(Portland, Maine), Jan. 12, 1787. This contradicts Cornell's thesis that
pistols were not constitutionally protected, since British General Tho-
mas Gage confiscated pistols as well as other firearms from the inhabi-
tants of Boston. RICHARD FROTHINGHAM, HISTORY OF THE SIEGE OF
BOSTON 95 (Little Brown & Co. 1903) ("[T]he people delivered to the
selectmen 1778 fire-arms, 634 pistols, 973 bayonets, and 38 blunder-
busses"). In the Declaration of Causes of Taking Up Arms of July 6,
1775, the Continental Congress decried Gage's seizure of the arms of
the people of Boston. 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
1774-1779, 151 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed. 1905).
115 Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, art. XVII (1780).
116 Scribble-Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Maine), Jan.
26, 1787.
117 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1151 n.165.
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young, men, women and boys, and not mili-
tia only, to keep and bear arms of every de-
scription, and not such merely as are used by
the militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed,
or broken in upon, in the smallest degree;
and all this for the important end to be at-
tained: the rearing up and qualifying a well-
regulated militia, so vitally necessary to the
security of a free State. Our opinion is, that
any law, State or Federal, is repugnant to the
Constitution, and void, which contravenes
this right ... 118
That interpretation is consistent with Tucker's re-
mark that liberty is endangered where "the right of the
people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext
whatsoever, prohibited . *.". ." ' Aside from the fact that
pistols were militia arms, Tucker's statements against the
English game laws demonstrate that firearms in general,
including hunting arms, were constitutionally protected.
Tucker contrasted the rights of Americans under the
Second Amendment with England, where "the people have
been disarmed, generally," so that "not one man in five
hundred can keep a gun in his house .... ,,120
CONCLUSION
Cornell asserts that Tucker's "writings fit neither
the modern collective nor individual rights models. In his
more mature writings, Tucker thus approached the right to
bear arms as both a right of the states and as a civic
right." 121  Aside from that not being Tucker's approach,
118 Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846).
119 TUCKER, supra note 2, at 300.
120 Id.
121 Cornell, supra note 17, at 1126.
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that is the "collective rights" model. Denial that a "right" is
individual necessarily implies that it is "collective." The
ideas of a state "right" to bear arms and of a person's "civic
right" to bear arms in the militia are two basic variants of
the collective rights model.
Having turned Tucker completely on his head, Cor-
nell expresses indignation about scholars who read Tuck-
er's words in their literal and ordinary way,
Far too much scholarly energy has been
wasted in the great American gun debate
trying to twist history to produce a usable
past. While both sides in this debate have
played the law office history game on occa-
sion, partisans of the individual-rights view
have been far more aggressive in pushing
their ideological agenda. . . . Reinterpreting
the Second Amendment as an individual
right does more than simply distort history
for ideological purposes, it also does great
violence to the text of the Constitution ...
122
Although Cornell is certainly correct in adding that
one cannot erase the Militia Clause from the text, one also
may not erase the substantive right. Those who deny that
the Second Amendment protects individual rights have
failed to articulate any inconsistency between recognition.
of the right of the populace to have arms and the resultant
encouragement of a militia.
The irony cannot be lost that Tucker, in his lectures
at William and Mary College of Law, explained the ramifi-
cations of the Second Amendment as an individual right in
detail, and that two centuries later, at the same College of
Law, in a symposium dedicated to Tucker's legacy, his
122/d. at 1154.
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views on the Second Amendment were obliterated. This
obliteration is accomplished by repeated veiled references
to "the often-quoted passage describing it [the Second
Amendment] as 'the true palladium of liberty,"'' 123 without
ever quoting that passage or any of the other rich passages
in which Tucker analyzed the broad character of the right to
keep and bear arms.
That brings us back to Tucker's insight that a bill of
rights is intended not only to instruct government on its
limits, but also to "giv[e] information to the people."'
124
Every person, even the most humble, therefore "may learn
his own rights, and know when they are violated .... ,125
Tucker synthesized the Founders' aspirations in favor of a
declaration of rights that was more than a scrap of paper.
This was the vision of the Founders with respect to every
provision of the Bill of Rights, not excluding the Second
Amendment.
121Id. at 1123-25, 1137, 1143.
124 TUCKER, supra note 2, at 308.
125 id.
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